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1. Introduction 
Islamic law is a legal system with a number of specific 
traits. The characteristic approach of Islam, or Islamic 
law that tries to recreate the entire economic reality in 
a form corresponding to its visions, while itself it can 
adapt to the requirements of economic practice on a 
limited basis, opens up a number of issues. Islamic 
scholars often define the Western financial system 
critically in their publications. They can be accepted 
on a number of points. However, Islamic finance itself 
is not subjected to the same evaluative approach. The 
texts of many authors put effort into defending Islamic 
teachings uncritically without undertaking an objec-
tive comparison. This black and white view of the 
whole issue is inadmissible. The presented text seeks a 
partial remedy of the outlined state based on studying 
the interaction between the principles of Islamic law 
and Islamic finance. The goal of the paper is to ana-
lyse whether a contradiction exists between the re-
quirements of Islam and the actual behaviour of the 
economy and economic entities formally operating 
under Islamic principles (mainly banks). 
The first section of paper focuses on the general 
characteristics of Islamic law. Attention is especially 
paid to clarification of the philosophy that designs the 
Islamic economy. The fundamental principles of Islam 
that have an elementary influence on a theoretical 
form of the Islamic economic and financial system are 
highlighted in the second part of the paper. This hypo-
thetical form is further developed in the third part. The 
final part of the paper focuses on demarcation of the 
inclusion of the current main features of the economic 
and financial realities in the theoretically determined 
form of Islamic economic organization. 
The financial crisis has strengthened the voices 
calling for greater emphasis on the moral dimension of 
economic interaction. For example, Daňhel and 
Ducháčková (2010) state that: ... increase of motives 
for ethical behaviour of participants in the economic 
interactions appears to be necessary. In this light, the 
Islamic point of view is very valuable and might offer 
welcome inspiration to reflect upon many economic 
dogmas. The professional community so far has not 
paid adequate attention to the issue of Islamic finance. 
As an exception can be mentioned, for example, the 
work of Weberová Babulíková (2001), who success-
fully describes the fundamental bases of Islamic bank-
ing and then compares them with the practise while 
identifying many diversions from the theory. It is also 
appropriate to point out the book by Hrdličková 
(2013), which focuses on the definition of the basic 
principles of Islamic finance and the description of 
fundamental financial products. Maitah (2010) de-
scribes Islamic finance and makes a comparison with 
its conventional counterpart in selected chapters. This 
author’s opinion is in favour of a gradual convergence 
of Islamic finance with Western finance. The limited 
offer of the domestic literature is balanced by the rich 
variety of literature sources available in English. Pri-
marily the work of Vogel et al. (1998) and from the 
current book the monographs by El-Gamal (2009) and 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011) should be underlined.  
2. Characteristics of Islamic law 
The beginning of the Islamic financial and economic 
principles dates to a turbulent period in the mid-
twentieth century. The decline of the colonial system 
as well as the newly acquired freedom of many Mus-
lim communities began a revival of the Muslim com-
munity. This was Islam, which has become a founda-
tion stone for building a distinctive political, economic 
and financial system. 
From the initial perspective, Islamic economics 
has an objective similar to that of its conventional 
counterpart, which is to support the optimal allocation 
of scarce resources. Kahf (undated) sees Western eco-
nomics as a science that deals with material issues in 
relation to resources, services and goods. The funda-
mental difference of Islamic economics is quite clear 
from the definition by Chapra (1985), who describes it 
as: … a branch of knowledge that helps realize human 
well-being through an allocation and distribution of 
scarce resources that is in conformity with Islamic 
teachings without unduly curbing individual freedom 
or creating continued macroeconomic and ecological 
imbalances. Islamic economics must thus be under-
stood not as an isolated concept but as one of the in-
struments of Islam on the path to building an ideal 
society based on both material and spiritual wealth: A 
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just economy is part of a just, healthy, and moral soci-
ety, which is the central objective of Islam (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2011). Similarly, the same approach can be 
followed when defining the Islamic financial system, 
which also cannot be seen in isolation, but in the con-
text of Islam as a whole, while its task in economic 
terms is similar to that of its conventional counterpart, 
that is, to mediate the monetary flow in the economy. 
The relationship of Islam with the economy and 
finance is based on a different philosophy. Western 
regulation aims to eliminate the market failures (for 
efficiency), to redistribute wealth within society (in 
the interest of justice) as well as to find a compromise 
between efficiency and equity (an effort to reach, or at 
least come close to, the point of bliss). The law is, 
therefore, an instrument with which the society regu-
lates the spontaneous order of economics, and not only 
that. In the last three decades, the insight into the role 
of law in relation to economics has shifted more to-
wards supporting the economy, especially on the 
North American continent. Here the interpretation of 
the law is understood as follows: …the purpose of law 
should be to support market mechanisms that aim to 
increase the tangible goods of participants in market 
relations.... (Bělohlávek and Halfar, 2003). In the case 
of Islam, its primary sources are a masterpiece by 
God. Therefore, they are unchangeable, as are the 
resulting eternal principles. Regulation of the econo-
my and finance is thus not only the result of Islam, but 
Islam itself, which is the fundamental building block.  
As is apparent from the text above, the Islamic 
economic and financial system is built especially to be 
in accordance with Islamic law, which is: … the pre-
ferred path to the Islamic economic system (Weberová 
Babulíková, 2001). Hrdličková (2013) defines Islamic 
law itself as … set of certain standards, which Mus-
lims believe were sent by God …. The terms Islamic 
law and Sharia cannot be seen as synonyms. As stated 
by Vogel et al. (1998), When referring to Islamic law, 
we usually always mean Fiqh, not Sharia. While Sha-
ria represents divine law that is perfect in every detail, 
Islamic jurisprudence, called Fiqh, is a human effort to 
understand the work of God. Sharia is thus based on 
the Quran and the Sunnah, i.e. primary, revealed 
sources. The word itself can be translated as the way 
to the spring or the path to follow. As emphasized by 
Vogel et al. (1998): ... while God knows its perfect law 
down to the last detail, people are in its interpretation 
often wrong, especially in partial detail. Knowledge, 
skills and understanding derived from primary law 
through specific methods are then referred to as sec-
ondary law. Islamic financial law is the application of 
Sharia to financial and commercial transactions. Is-
lamic banking, as we know it today, has not been the 
subject of classical Islamic law. However, the current 
growth of Islamic banking is not accompanied by a 
replacement or rewriting of Islamic law, but is accom-
panied by the effort of its application. 
Anglo-Saxon law, which is created by judges, has 
many similarities to Islamic law, as evidenced by the 
judges. Despite this, Islamic law is considered to be 
the third major legal system – together with the conti-
nental European system (Boháček, 2004). Here, how-
ever, a paradoxical situation may arise. Many Muslim 
countries, such as Sudan and Pakistan, have a legal 
system that is designed along the lines of the continen-
tal European system. The effort to implement Islamic 
law, which is an accompanying phenomenon of the 
Islamization of financial regulation to a civil law sys-
tem, therefore faces many problems (see Rosen, 
2000). Islamic law is a religious law; its scope is not 
limited to application in specific areas, but is primarily 
intended for people of the Islam faith – Muslims, alt-
hough some provisions are also targeted at non-
Muslims, especially the so-called People of the Book 
(Christians and Jews). The Islamic law originates from 
and is inseparably associated with Islam. This is also 
evidenced by the fact that the terms theologian and 
lawyer are for the most part synonyms in the Islamic 
world. In reality, no country is governed by Islamic 
law unconditionally, although some countries have 
incorporated the Quran and Sunnah into their constitu-
tional system. 
The life of a Muslim is governed by Islam, which 
is not, however, a synonym for Islamic law. Islam 
includes several different sets of rules. The first group, 
known as Aqidah, governs the relationship between 
people and God. The second transforms the faith in 
God into the practice of everyday life. It is known as 
Sharia. The third group is Akhlaq, governing behav-
iour, attitudes and the work ethic. Sharia itself is fur-
ther divided into two subgroups: Ibadat and Muama-
lat. The former focuses on the rites and rituals that 
lead a Muslim to an internal understanding with God. 
The second governs an economic life (not exclusively, 
as it also deals with other issues). However, the regu-
lation of commerce and the Islamic financial and 
banking system lies precisely in this subset of Sharia 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). 
The sources of Islam can be divided into primary 
and secondary sources. There is no agreement on the 
summary and simultaneously on the division of the 
sources of Islam: Some scholars refer to over 40 dif-
ferent sources, and others to only 15 (Bezoušková, 
2008). The primary sources are the Quran and Sunnah 
(hadiths). The Quran was sent directly by God, and 
Sunnah is a collection of the Prophet’s stories and at 
the same time is considered a source of law only in the 
case in which an obligation is deduced that is not in-
cluded in the Quran in any way. Otherwise, it has an 
explanatory function. These two sources were com-
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posed during the life of Muhammad. His death meant 
the completion of the first creation of the sources, 
despite some classification and arrangement of the 
Quran and writing of the hadiths taking place for some 
time afterwards. From the viewpoint of legal sources, 
verse 2:231 is controversial; according to some defini-
tions, it also allows the use of Christian and Jewish 
saint texts. However, there is no agreement amongst 
Muslim authorities regarding the understanding of this 
verse, and thus it is an example of the occasional lack 
of clarity of the Quran. 
The institute of fatwa has a fundamental role in Is-
lamic law. This is not a source of law, but the opinion 
of an expert on Islamic law (mufti) regarding a partic-
ular problem. It is often issued in response to a direct 
question, but may also be published on the scholar’s 
own initiative. It is necessary to ensure the credibility 
of fatwas, as the character of their individual opinion 
on a particular problem makes them prone to subjec-
tive interpretative differences.2 Fatwas are not neces-
sarily binding for Muslims. Their authority lies in the 
erudition of Islamic scholars, who try to give people 
instructions on how to behave as closely as possible to 
the message of God. It is thus in the interest of every 
Orthodox Muslim to listen to them, because God re-
wards those who follow his message faithfully. Fatwas 
play a crucial role in the Islamic finance sector. In 
1979, the lawyer Ibn Shubruma issued a fatwa con-
firming the compliance of a Murabaha subtype with 
Islam, allowing the foundation of modern Islamic 
banking. In the contemporary Islamic finance sector, 
the institute of fatawas plays an important role. A 
fatawa is in many aspects similar to a fatwa, but it is 
issued by the members of the law council or internal 
supervisory authority (the Sharia Supervisory Board) 
on the initiative of lawyers, bankers and other parties 
interested in Islamic finance. The purpose of a fatawa 
is to confirm the compliance of a particular financial 
product with Sharia, through which its purity is de-
clared (El-Gamal, 2009). 
 Within the context of the existing interpretation, 
the question arises of the ability of Islamic law to 
																																																													
1 If in doubt about what we have sent down to our servant, 
then produce a sura similar to this one and call your wit-
nesses beside Allah if you are truthful (Hrbek, 2007, 2:23). 
2 For Orthodox Muslims, in order not to let themselves be 
seduced by a wrong fatwa, it is desirable to approach fatwas 
critically. The present opinion of the scholars needs to be 
assessed in terms of the reputation of its author and the 
evidence on which it relies. If more contradictory fatwas 
exist on a given question, it is appropriate to compare the 
presented evidence and arguments. A believer himself must 
accept the final decision, in accordance with his conscience, 
not a rational calculus. 
respond to the emerging challenges that inevitably 
occur hand in hand with the rapid development of 
society. Potměšil (2012) states in relation to this issue 
that ... the Islamic law of God according to Islamic 
doctrine has been given to man once and for all – the 
company itself has to adapt to the law, rather than to 
create its own laws as a response to the ever-changing 
challenges of everyday life. Where God expressed 
explicitly, there is no space for relativization. On the 
other hand, Muslims themselves admit that the mes-
sage of God was in many aspects not sent in a com-
pletely clear and understandable form. Primary 
sources are often general and vague. Precisely this 
attribute is the advantage that allows Islam to respond 
to the development of the world: The history so far 
has not recorded a case in which Muslim scholars 
were not able to provide solutions to a new problem 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, 2011). Thus, within the limits of 
interpretation, Islamic law is essentially flexible. 
However, still on the issue of the flexibility of Islamic 
law, there is no clear answer. As Hrdličková (2013) 
mentions: ... among a number of scholars, the re-
quirement for rigidity of Islamic law prevails. Contro-
versy exists inter alia in the possibilities of leaving the 
norms of Islamic law that were interpreted in favour of 
the new interpretation. 
The role of Islamic law in the life of a Muslim is 
different from the role of law for a citizen in the West-
ern concept. This is already apparent from the simple 
fact that Islam and its resulting rules reflect the will of 
the Creator, who is also the sole legislator. It is under-
standable, therefore, that the orthodox follower of 
Islam prefers it to the earthly standard. Muslims can-
not, in good faith, compartmentalize their behaviour 
into religious and secular dimensions, and their ac-
tions are always bound by the Sharia (Hassan and 
Lewis, 2007). The difficulties in separating Islam and 
the state in countries where Islam is a dominant reli-
gion are completely understandable. Although indi-
rectly resulting from the text above, it is appropriate to 
underline the fact that a Muslim must follow Islamic 
law even if he resides or stays in a non-Muslim coun-
try. Analogously, an Islamic bank operating in a non-
Muslim country should preferably follow Islamic law 
over the secular law effective in the given state. Trakic 
(2012) reflects this fact, stating that: ... Islamic bank-
ing products ... are in the first place Shari'ah compli-
ant and secondly … are in accordance with the EU 
legislative. The incompatibility of Islamic law and the 
banking regulations of the country where the Islamic 
bank would like to expand its business is not an ac-
ceptable argument for departure from the principles of 
Islam. Thus, the operation of the Islamic bank would 
not be feasible in such a country. Also different is the 
structure of a legal standard itself. The standard’s 
ideal does not have the form of a concise, clear stand-
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ard, only governing unnecessary aspects in order to 
allow for the maximum possible level of freedom of 
an individual. The Islamic legal standards are de-
signed to try to balance out the individual’s life with 
God’s will entirely and therefore: ... are aimed at a 
normative revision of all thinkable areas of human 
behaviour to the smallest details (Potměšil, 2012). In 
this light, it is obvious that the legal users’ needs are 
not a priority. The number of command standards does 
not count in the earthly punishment for their violation 
– the punishment is supposed to be carried out by God 
himself. 
The unmistakable undertone resonating through Is-
lam is a strong social orientation, solidarity with those 
in need, as well as a desire for justice. Although the 
principle of solidarity in Islamic economics is strong, 
it cannot be made to conform to socialism or com-
munism: ... Islamic economics is based on the idea of 
justice and equality, but not egalitarianism (Weberová 
Babulíková, 2001). In addition, the incomparability is 
underlined by the Islamic respect for private property. 
In general, Islam views wealth in a positive manner. 
Wealth is seen as a well-deserved reward for hard 
work and risk-taking, while poverty is the greatest 
threat to the preservation of Islam (Maitah, 2010). 
Muhammad himself dedicated part of his life to busi-
ness and trading. Undoubtedly, therefore, he assumed 
that profit reflects the human desire to perform better 
and that it is a driving force behind both the individual 
and the entire economy. Consequently, Islam permits 
wealth, but only to the extent that it brings a benefit 
not only to a man himself: ... i.e. if the assets are not 
gathered only for the assets themselves (Weberová 
Babulíková, 2001). Such a state does not bring rele-
vant benefits either to its owner or to a society as a 
whole. Any excess3 should be used for some pious 
work or charity (Hrbek, 2007). 
3. Fundamental principles of Islam in relation to 
economics and finance 
Sharia is the fundamental set of principles of Islamic 
finance and financial services. The literature, in an 
attempt to capture their essence, highlights several key 
principles. The paper follows this approach. As noted 
by Hrdličková (2013), Sharia is characterized in rela-
tion to finance by a number of prohibitions and re-
strictions: Islamic finance is therefore de facto based 
on the principle of certain prohibitions, and so is often 
																																																													
3 Excess is defined as the difference between the needs of an 
individual and the wealth possessed. However, a subject of 
consideration is whether the excess defined as such can be 
reached considering the impossibility of the satisfaction of 
human needs. 
referred to as prohibitive. The purpose of compliance 
with the prohibitions is to allow an increase of permit-
ted business operations. El-Gamal (2009) perceives 
riba and gharar as the two main prohibitions. Another 
important limitation is maisir, which is also referred to 
as a defining feature of Islamic finance for example by 
Hassan and Lewis (2007) and Hrdličková (2013). 
Islam is more than just prohibitions. For the purposes 
of this paper, the following principles of Islamic fi-
nance and financial services are crucial: 
 Prohibition of riba; 
 Zakat; 
 Maisir and gharar; 
 Sharing of profits and losses; 
 Halal and haram. 
It should be emphasized that the behaviour of a Mus-
lim must be in harmony with Islam across the whole 
range. It cannot succumb to the illusion that the 
above-mentioned list of principles provides a compre-
hensive list of the principles by which financial insti-
tutions, whether Muslim or Islamic, are governed. 
Presently, the prohibition of riba is considered a 
synonym of the prohibition of interest. This is not 
entirely accurate. Unfortunately, the concept has no 
equivalent in English. Any attempt to translate it is 
doomed to be inaccurate. Riba in direct translation 
means increase, addition, additional fee (Hrdličková, 
2012b). The word, however, is often confused with 
rabi.ha. This can be translated as profit or revenue 
(Hasan and Lewis, 2007). This gives the origin to the 
myth of cost-free Islamic banking (Hrdličková, 
2012b). If we refer to Hrbek’s or Nykl’s translation of 
the Quran, we learn that this term is translated as usu-
ry. This is not accidental. The translation should be 
based on the practice applied during those times, as 
the Quran could have prohibited only what was com-
mon in the society and what Muhammad could have 
encountered. In pre-Islamic society, a debtor had two 
options at the time of maturity of his/her debt – either 
to pay it off or to request a deferral in exchange for 
doubling the debt. It is that convention that the Quran 
addresses: You who believe! Do not make your living 
through usury producing a profit twice, instead fear 
your God, so you may be blessed (Hrbek, 2007, 
3:130). In the context of the time, this translation is 
appropriate because doubling the amount owed would 
even from today’s perspective be seen as usury rather 
than interest. In addition, at the time of Muhammad 
reciting his verses, the monetary economy did not 
exist, and barter transactions were part of everyday 
life. Furthermore, because interest is defined as a re-
ward for lending money, riba cannot, in this sense, be 
considered interest. 
The primary sources do not provide a clear answer 
to the question of a precise definition of riba. There-
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fore, this gap has been interpreted in the secondary 
sources. In efforts to give clear content to the term, 
two opposing groups stood against each other – the 
reformists and the conservatives. The reformists gen-
erally defended the interpretation of riba as usury 
(excessive interest, not interest as such). However, the 
winning conservative stream strictly rejected the ar-
guments of the reformists and labelled them as an 
attempt to circumvent Muhammad’s words – hijal 
(loop, trick). Riba is mentioned in verses 2:275–279, 
3:130, 4:161 and 30:39 of the Quran and in several 
hadiths. The most notable is the last of the verses 
(30:39), in which it is written: What you take as usury, 
so that it brings multiplication taken from the assets of 
others, does not bring any interest with God. Riba is 
again translated here as usury. However, the context 
implies that usury is considered to be such behaviour 
whereby one is enriched at the expense of others with-
out one’s own efforts: Every profit is to be achieved 
through one’s own efforts and on one’s own account, 
and not by exploiting one’s fellow man or at his ex-
pense, although these may be artfully obscured by 
financial phrases (Hrbek, 2007). The conservatives 
used the argumentation based on the spirit of the pri-
mary sources. The mission is clear according to them 
– the profit should be based on the work or the risk 
taken (yet reasonable). However, interest, with its 
characteristic properties, goes against Muhammad’s 
vision. The risk and effort, in the case of an interest-
bearing loan, lie mainly on the shoulders of the debtor. 
Regardless of whether the money lent has increased in 
value, a debtor must pay, in addition to the principal 
sum, further remuneration to the capital owner. It was 
these arguments that led Islamic scholars to believe 
that it is necessary to perceive interest as riba.4 
However, the riba concept itself has a broader 
meaning. Islamic law identifies two main subtypes of 
riba. These are riba al-qurud, which currently prohibits 
the use of interest in loans, and riba al-buyu, which is 
subject to usury in business transactions. Riba al-buyu 
is bound to the contractual relationship, in which the 
object of the contract is measured in units or can be 
considered. It is itself divided into two other types – 
riba al-fadl and riba al-nisa. The first of the pair in-
cludes the prohibition of unequal exchange, either in 
quantitative or in qualitative terms, of the same com-
modity at the same time (spot trading). The second is 
																																																													
4 The prohibition of interest is not unknown to European 
culture. Aristotle perceived money as sterile. In his opinion, 
the medium of exchange should be equivalent. Exchanging 
money for money cannot generate any profit for the lender, 
as this would be unfair. He thus understood lending at inter-
est as evil as one party was enriched unreasonably at the 
expense of the other (Holman, 2005). 
also an inadequate shift, but is not simultaneous5 (Ha-
san and Lewis, 2007).  
Islamic economists pay special attention to justifi-
cation of the prohibition of interest. However, their 
arguments are burdened by the absence of an objective 
approach. They cannot be objective, since riba is not a 
product of economic efficiency, but a religious princi-
ple (Maitah, 2010). The conservatives, particularly for 
example Mohamad Báqir as-Sadr, were fully aware of 
the irreplaceable role of interest in the contemporary 
economy. Instead of trying to reform the existing con-
ventional system, they came up with a new model that 
meets the requirements of Islam. The foundation stone 
was the construction of the new financial sector – this 
effort is mainly reflected in contemporary Islamic 
banking. Interest has been replaced by an alternative – 
the principle of sharing profits and losses. 
Zakat is a religious tax. It expresses the often-
mentioned emphasis on solidarity with those who are 
less successful. From the perspective of Islam, zakat is 
seen as a return of part of the assets enabled by God. 
At the same time, the rest of the assets, which are a 
reflection of a sinful desire to own, are purified in the 
eyes of God (Potměšil, 2012). The collection should in 
theory be voluntary, but even during the lifetime of 
Muhammad, it became rather an obligatory contribu-
tion. It raised the question of how many assets one 
should contribute. According to the Islamic philoso-
phy, one should pay what one does not need to live, 
i.e. any excess. However, an amount determined thus 
is very problematic. On one hand, human needs are 
essentially non-satisfiable – fulfilling one need results 
in another need rising in parallel. On the other hand, it 
is obvious that this formulation leaves room for radi-
cal leftist thinking. There is always someone who feels 
authorized to define how much another person needs 
and what is the excess, which is subsequently confis-
cated. The issue of zakat was a central element of the 
discussions about the compatibility of Islam with 
communism. However, Muslims refused the option of 
gradual convergence towards radical leftist utopianism 
(Kropáček, 2003). A contribution defined in general as 
all excesses was very quickly replaced by a much 
																																																													
5 In order for trade not to be subsumed under riba al-buyu, it 
is necessary to carry out transactions at the same time (as 
proclaimed by the Prophet: There is no riba except with 
deferment and There is no riba in hand-to-hand transac-
tions), and when trading with goods of the same kind, the 
exchange must be equivalent: Gold is to be paid for by gold, 
silver by silver, wheat by wheat, barley by barley, dates by 
dates, and salt by salt, like for like and equal for equal, 
payment being made hand to hand. If these classes differ, 
then sell as you wish if payment is made hand to hand (Sa-
hih Muslim Book 10, Hadith 3853). 
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more accurate definition. The zakat is still collected 
today. The amount is fixed at 2.5% of the assets, pro-
vided that it exceeds the minimum set limit, and is 
collected annually. 
While it may seem that the importance of zakat 
lies mainly in the social or fiscal area, it has a signifi-
cant overlap with finance. In the Quran, riba and zakat 
are put into contrast: God will destroy usury (riba), 
but will pay alms (zakat) (Hrbek, 2007, 2:276). How-
ever, from the financial point of view, it is not so con-
trasting. It is impossible for Islamic current accounts 
to pay interest (the prohibition of riba) or appreciate 
the money otherwise (the principle of sharing profits 
and losses). In terms of its nominal amount, the money 
deposited in current accounts loses 2.5% of its value 
every year.  
Maisir was in pre-Islamic society a lottery gam-
bling game, as can be inferred from the Quran verse 
2:219: They ask you about wine and the maisir game. 
Say: “In both lies grave sin and benefit to mankind. 
But their sin is graver than their benefit” – and in 
verse 5:90: ... Wine, maisir game, sacrificial stones 
and throwing lots of arrows are indeed abhorrent 
things from the work of Satan ...  Maisir can be trans-
lated as an easy achievement without work (Hrbek, 
2007). In later times, the meaning of the word expand-
ed to include all gambling.6 The same conceptual ex-
tension fell on the prohibition of wine, which was later 
extended to the prohibition of all alcohol. 
Although from the perspective of the financial sys-
tem the prohibition of gambling may seem trivial, it is 
not. This principle has been very thoroughly expanded 
to cover all social relations, including economics and 
finance: Islamic law … forbids any business activities 
which contain any element of gambling (Hassan and 
Lewis, 2007). If we look at the etymology of the word 
gambling it is characterized as: Risky activities or 
business, whose actual outcome depends on lucky 
chance or a happy set of circumstances.7 In other 
words, any activity, the outcome of which cannot be 
affected by an entrepreneur or can be influenced only 
indirectly, is prohibited. The result of this is that the 
compatibility of Islamic financial law, for example, 
																																																													
6 Islam, somewhat illogically, also understands chess as 
gambling. The basis in this case is the Hadith: Buraida re-
ported on the authority of his father that Allah’s Apostle 
(may peace be upon him) said: He who played chess is like 
one who dyed his hand with the flesh and blood of swine 
(see The Book of Poetry, č. 5612). 
7 Meaning of the word hazard. Accessed on 25 April 2013. 
Available at: <http://www.synonyma.postis.org/hazard. 
html>. 
with financial derivatives8 or conventional insurance 
business activities is excluded. 
While riba and maisir are embedded directly in the 
Quran, in the case of gharar it is important to rely on 
the hadiths (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). The word gha-
rar originates from Arabic and means uncertainty or a 
large and excessive risk in commercial transactions 
(Hrdličková, 2012b). Igbal and Mirakhor (2011) un-
derstand gharar as exposure to excessive risk and haz-
ard in commercial transactions, due to either a lack of 
information or information asymmetry regarding the 
price, quality and quantity of consideration, data of 
delivery and the ability of the buyer or seller to fulfil 
the commitment. The principle of gharar has many 
consequences in the economic sphere. In the case of 
business relationships, it concerns a ban on the sale of 
an item subject to uncertainty in terms of its future 
existence (whether something will be successfully 
produced, caught, etc.) or its partial characteristics (for 
example whether something will be produced in suffi-
cient quantity). An example can be a situation in 
which a merchant tries to sell a product that is not yet 
in his possession – fruit that has not yet ripened or still 
uncaught fish. The principle of gharar has an impact 
on the financial sector. Contrary to it are such situa-
tions in which one party makes use of the loss of an-
other entity under conditions of uncertainty. Conven-
tional insurance is therefore in contradiction not only 
to the principle of maisir, but to the principle of gharar 
– the insurance company earns from the insured even 
in the case when the harmful event does not occur. 
Similarly, the prohibition relates to speculation on 
stock markets, etc. A contractual relationship with the 
above-listed characteristics is invalid. On the other 
hand, it is clear that a certain degree of risk and uncer-
tainty in human activity is often unavoidable, especial-
ly during business activities. In the words of Iqbal and 
Mirakhor (2011), The prohibition of gharar sale (bay 
al-gharar) indicates that the contract, which is in 
breach of this principle, is defected ... Under such a 
sale can be classified a situation where gharar is a 
																																																													
8 Jílek (2009) deals with the negative impact of derivatives 
with reference to their similarity to gambling, thus indirectly 
defending an Islamic approach to gambling in finance: Their 
risk (of derivatives) is based, among others, on their inclu-
sion of gambling in the economic area. The activities of 
productive people are focused on gambling and on how to 
win over the market instead of on a productive activity, i.e. 
the production of goods and services. As a result, economic 
units become less competitive in the market and lay off their 
employees, unemployment increases and the overall GDP is 
reduced. The hazard of some individuals affects ordinary 
people.  
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core component.9 This type of sale is referred to as 
gharar sale and is unanimously prohibited. However, 
small (minority) gharar does not make the sales con-
tract invalid because no contract is not entirely free 
from certain risk. Subjective consideration of whether 
the uncertainty is acceptable is therefore often in-
volved. 
Sharing of profits and losses is a fundamental 
principle of Islamic economics determining its specif-
ic character. Money is viewed in an Islamic economy 
differently from in Western economies. The purpose is 
not to accumulate money, as such an activity is con-
sidered to be an act of injustice. The primary task of 
money is to arrange an exchange. In the context of the 
zakat and riba prohibitions, money in the Islamic 
economy loses the function of value preservation 
(Maitah, 2010). Money is seen as potential capital. It 
only becomes real capital when it is used in productive 
activities (Osina, 2012). Islamic economics under-
stands the sale of money for money as something ab-
surd and immoral, and this absurdity is represented by 
interest. It is in no way connected with the actual prof-
itability of the business plan implemented: According 
to the classical concept the lender receives the same 
interest in each case (Smrča, 2010). Interest, from the 
point of view of Islamic economics, represents an 
injustice, because the system based on it shows an 
exceptionally asymmetrical distribution of risk. The 
risk is not carried by the saver, who deposits money in 
the bank, because his/her money is in most cases ade-
quately insured. Similarly, thanks to diversification 
and collateral, the risk of the bank is also significantly 
reduced. The truth is that in a system based on inter-
est, the significant majority of the risk is carried on the 
shoulders of productive units – entrepreneurs. The 
interest is characterized by the fact that it is inextrica-
bly linked with money, not with real production and 
sales. In addition, it has no feedback on the success or 
failure of the entrepreneur. The use of money to create 
more money prevents societal development (Hrdličko-
vá, 2012b).10 
																																																													
9 This means that large, excessive risk is the main character-
istic of such a contract. That is why, for example, insurance 
and derivatives (whether financial or commodity) are 
banned altogether – the risk and uncertainty are an integral 
part of them. 
10 The arguments of Islamic scholars for the prohibition of 
interest also resonate with the medieval Christian philoso-
phy. As noted by Holman (2005) … All scholastics thought 
usury as immoral and sinful. If profit of merchant was justi-
fiable as a reward for his work and risk, thus lending money 
at interest was for them fully unjustified because it did not 
mean neither work nor risk for the moneylender. They did 
not see any reason that would justify the existence of inter-
est. 
The arguments that led Islamic lawmakers to pro-
hibit interest are extremely important in determining 
the overall perceptions of profit in Islamic economics. 
Interest is condemned as unfair and exploitative. A 
system that should be in accordance with Islam must 
be based on cooperation and morality. The principle of 
sharing of profits and losses is a logical response to 
the philosophy of Islam, and this principle has been 
unforgettably reflected in the requirements for the 
products of local banks and has determined the char-
acter of Islamic finance as a whole. 
The sharing of profits and losses changes the rela-
tionship of creditor and debtor. Instead of lending the 
funds for a pre-fixed rate, a partnership is created 
between them. If there is a profit, it can be divided 
according to a predetermined criterion. In the case of a 
loss, the creditor is also involved in covering it and the 
principal borrowed is thus proportionally reduced. A 
bank is extremely motivated to lend its money to pro-
jects that promise a high rate of returns. Islamic schol-
ars believe that the allocation of resources in the econ-
omy will be so much more effective: Weberová para-
phrases Siddigi by stating that There is no reason to 
believe that the most profitable businesses will be 
those with rich owners. However, the conventional 
system cannot locate resources other than under this 
key, and therefore not to the most productive busi-
nesses, in which the system of profit sharing is suc-
cessful (Weberová Babulíková, 2001). In their view, 
such a system should be much less prone to infla-
tion.11 
The literal translation of the term halal is lawful. 
The opposite of the word halal is haram (Boček et al., 
2003). Halal is considered to be everything that is in 
accordance with the Islamic religion and therefore also 
in accordance with Islamic law. The Orthodox Muslim 
should not digest or use anything that is not halal, 
although a breach is allowed in extreme situations, in 
which there are no other options. Halal cannot be 
viewed only as an indication of the allowed food, but 
more broadly as thoughts, deeds and things that are 
permitted to Muslims and which do not bring with 
																																																													
11 This idea is worth considering. Money is primarily an 
instrument of trade. Money is not of a separate value since 
the value has been determined by the product that can be 
purchased with it. In a system based on interest, inflation 
occurs due to the failure of many projects. Although the loan 
does not create any value, it must be paid, including interest. 
A creditor becomes richer despite his/her profit not being 
based on a real increase of wealth in society. On the contra-
ry, it is possible that the production decreases, because an 
entrepreneur will have to reduce the production, or will even 
fail. If we analyse the situation in the equation of exchange: 
M∙V=↑P∙↓Q. 
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them a religious sanction either in this world or in the 
Hereafter ....12 Islamic finance, which functions in 
accordance with Islamic law, is halal. On the other 
hand, it cannot be said that non-Islamic banking is 
automatically haram. It is always important to analyse 
the product and examine its compatibility with Islamic 
law. One of the basic principles of Islam is the permis-
sibility of all things. If something is not prohibited, 
and if it does not contradict Islamic law, it is under-
stood to be allowed. 
Haram can be translated as bans. Some of them are 
elaborated in primary law and others by legal science. 
The Quran mentions in particular the prohibition of 
eating carcasses, blood and pork, wine drinking, 
drunkenness, corruption and adultery.13 If something 
is haram, it must not be the subject of buying and 
selling, even though it is not consumed by the Muslim 
himself. The Islamic legal system divides all human 
actions into one of five groups: (1) actions required by 
the Quran (fard, wajib), (2) recommended actions 
based on the Prophet’s words and practice, (3) indif-
ferent actions (Islam does not comment on them in 
any way), (4) despicable actions (makruh) and (5) 
forbidden actions (haram) (Potměšil, 2012). 
Islamic financial law allows investment only in au-
thorized areas. Those are considered the areas that are 
neither haram (prohibited) nor makruh (despicable). 
For an investment to be halal, both the form of service 
and the subject of investment must be in accordance 
with Islam. The form means the terms and conditions 
imposed by Islamic financial law on each product. The 
products must primarily respect the condition to avoid 
riba and excessive as well as speculative and risky 
activities (gharar and maisir). The investment must 
exclude in particular pork, gambling and betting, casi-
no, alcohol and pornography. In assessing whether a 
given investment area is allowed or prohibited, it is 
also necessary to take into account the principle Eve-
rything that leads to the prohibited is itself prohibited 
(Al-Islam website, 2011). For example, no one can 
invest in pork production or build a property that in 
turn would be leased to a pork producer. The specifici-
																																																													
12 See Nedorozumění ohledně pojmů halál a zebíha a prak-
tická řešení problematiky halál masa. E-Islam. Accessed on 
20 April 2014. Available at: <http://1url.cz/7a4I>. 
13 Prohibited to you are dead animals, blood, the flesh of 
swine, and that which has been dedicated to other than 
Allah, and those animals killed by strangling or by a violent 
blow or by a head-long fall or by the goring of horns, and 
those from which a wild animal has eaten, except what you 
slaughter, and those which are sacrificed on stone altars … 
(Quran, 5:3). And do not approach unlawful sexual inter-
course. Indeed, it is ever an immorality and is evil as a way 
(Quran, 17:32). 
ty of each investment leads to its individual assess-
ment. The acceptability or unacceptability is assessed 
in Islamic banks by an internal group of Islamic schol-
ars, and conclusions on the acceptability of the in-
vestment can differ not only between individual coun-
tries but also between banks in the same country. 
4. Specific traits of Islamic economics and finance 
As stated above, it is Islamic law that paves the way 
for an Islamic economic system. Therefore, its select-
ed institutes outlined in the previous chapter resulted 
on one hand in the prohibition of many financial prod-
ucts commonly found in the West and on the other 
hand in the appearance of a wide range of specific 
products. It should be underlined that the Islamic eco-
nomic theory is not uniform. There are several theo-
ries for many economic issues, which may even be 
contradictory. In addition, their actual implementation 
within the country creates other specifics. It is a tax 
for its relatively short existence, which dates back to 
approximately the Second World War. 
The basic building block of Islamic economics and 
finance is Mudarabah. In its theoretical form it is a 
manifestation of the principle of sharing risks and 
losses. It is often mistakenly referred to as a banking 
product, which does not fully capture its character. Its 
role is on several levels. Islamic banks present it as a 
product offered to the customers. In fact, it further 
regulates the relationship between the bank and the 
depositor (Hrdličková, 2012a), and the principles upon 
which Mudarabah builds are also considered by the 
Islamic economic theorists as a fundamental pillar of 
an economy compliant with Islam. 
Mudarabah is generally defined as a partnership 
between human and financial capital: The term refers 
to a form of business contract in which one party 
brings capital and the other personal effort (Institute 
of Islamic Banking and Insurance website, undated). 
The central idea in the concept of Mudarabah is that 
two parties, one with capital and the other with know-
how, get together to carry out a project (Gafoor, 
2001). Mudarabah is therefore based on an agreement 
between one or more investors (i.e. the owners of 
capital; in Arabic such a person is referred to as a rab 
al maal) and an agent (in Arabic mudárib).14 The 
agent acts as a manager who manages the funds en-
trusted. Upon the termination of this partnership, the 
																																																													
14 If Mudarabah regulates the relationship between a deposi-
tor and a bank, the depositor acts as an investor and the bank 
acts as an agent managing the funds entrusted. On the con-
trary, if Mudarabah serves as a tool for financing, the bank 
acts as an investor and a person coming with a business plan 
as an agent. 
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agent is entitled to reimbursement of the costs he in-
vested and to a profit. The investor in turn receives the 
rest, that is, the principal and interest from the reve-
nue. 
The roots of Mudarabah can be traced to the pre-
Islamic period. In the 1950s, when the voices calling 
for an economy governed by Islamic principles began 
to increase in Islamic countries, the need to submit a 
new economic theory satisfying such requirements 
arose. Such a concept was presented by Muhammad 
Nejatullah Siddigi (Siddigi, 1983). He built the theory 
on the principle of profit sharing, and he was inspired 
by the principle of Mudarabah in its development. The 
economy, in his interpretation, can be described as 
Mudarabah in large (Weberová Babulíková, 2001). A 
fundamental mechanism of such an economy is the 
establishment of the funds managed by banks, in 
which each depositor will save his/her money. The 
banks then further invest the money. Mudarabah in 
this concept can be compared with collective invest-
ment. It is obvious that it would be impractical, con-
sidering the high transaction costs, to monitor the rate 
of return of each Mudarabah. Instead, the deposits are 
merged with the funds. The deposits are consequently 
invested and the revenue is divided proportionally 
among the investors while the bank charges the costs 
invested and a share of the revenue from this profit. 
The cost of capital will not be the interest, but a prob-
able rate of return. 
Mudarabah is also presented at the theoretical level 
by Islamic scholars as the main product of Islamic 
banks. It is intended for long-term financing. Mu-
hammad Sadr perceived it as essential to create such 
an environment in which Mudarabah is considered a 
standard, not an exception. Muhammad Siddigi com-
pletely identified himself with Sadr’s view when he 
claimed that a system based on profit sharing should 
always be preferred to methods based on the addition-
al charge method (Weberová Babulíková, 2001). 
Another financial product based on the principle of 
sharing profit and loss, in addition to Mudarabah, is 
Musharaka. It is a partnership of two and more people 
who combine capital and labour in a joint venture and 
the results of this partnership in the form of profits are 
divided according to a predetermined ratio, while the 
loss is shared according to the share (Rammal, 2004). 
In the case of Musharaka, compared with Mudarabah, 
all the partners have the right, but not the obligation, 
to participate directly in the management of the pro-
ject. 
The principles of Islamic financial law emphasize 
that profit is justifiable as a reward for the risk taken 
or the work carried out. This principle determines the 
form of deposits in Islamic banks. Islamic banking 
works with two types of accounts – current and in-
vestment. In the case of a current account, a customer 
bears no risk and therefore is not entitled to any profit 
in any form. The deposited funds are managed under 
the type of contract called wadia.15 Investment ac-
counts are then increased in value in accordance with 
the principle of sharing of profits and losses. 
The legislation on bank deposits comes under the 
scrutiny of Islamic scholars, especially when consider-
ing the operation of Islamic banks in the European 
regulatory framework. The principles of Islamic fi-
nance allow a profit only under the assumption of 
undertaking the risk of loss. Current accounts in the 
Islamic concept thus do not generate any profit. Profit 
can only be granted for investment accounts, for 
which, however, the rate of return cannot be guaran-
teed beforehand. The rate of return is derived only on 
the basis of the real success of banks in the allocation 
of resources, while if there is a loss it is debited from 
the deposits in investment accounts. This philosophy 
is problematic in many European countries. Trakic 
(2012) notes, for example, that Islamic banks cannot 
be regarded as a bank in the Italian legal framework, 
because it works in a different way: it does not collect 
deposits from the public with a guaranteed rate of 
return and consequently does not provide loans, which 
are currently two essential conditions that define the 
Italian legal environment of the bank. Somewhat more 
favourable to Islamic banking is the legislation of the 
UK, which is among others related to the Anglo-
Saxon system of law used there. Islamic lawyer Al-
dohni (2012) identifies three main conditions that 
define a bank in the English legislative framework – 
(1) receiving repayable funds from the public, (2) 
offering current accounts and (3) issuing cheques and 
processing transactions. Analysing the requirements 
imposed by Islamic law, he reaches, in terms of the 
functioning of Islamic banks in the light of the above 
conditions, a positive conclusion, stating: The practise 
shows that Islamic banks have all the main character-
istics of the banking business – offering current ac-
counts, checks and transactions, including overdraft 
options. In other words, they have all the characteris-
tics required by the British case law ... (Aldohni, 
2012). 
Deposits are insured in the European Union 
against a loss of up to 100,000 EUR.16 The definition 
																																																													
15 Wadiah means a depository. It is an authorization to the 
third party for safekeeping of the depositor’s assets. As a 
rule, the third person is not allowed to use the deposit while 
at the depository (Potměšil, 2012). 
16 Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council of 11 March 2009 amending Directive 94/19/EC 
on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage level 
and the payout delay. 
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of a deposit in the Czech Republic is to be found in 
the Czech Banking Act, in which it is understood as 
entrusted funds, which constitute an obligation of the 
depositor for the payment.17 In the case of deposits, 
any sharing of losses is thus impossible. A form of 
revenue sharing is also an issue, because the revenues 
in the Islamic environment cannot be predetermined at 
a fixed rate. However, the domestic legislation is in 
this sense nonconformist. The revenue from the cur-
rent account cannot be continuously adapted to the 
current success rate of the bank.18 On the other hand, 
domestic regulation enables banks to offer clients 
current accounts with no use of interest. Even though 
the law states that ...the payment service provider is 
liable to pay the service user (the account holder) the 
agreed interest from the balance on the current ac-
count (Štenglová et al., 2010), the obligation to nego-
tiate such interest in its text is not mentioned. Thus, 
due to the nature of commercial law, when the princi-
ple of what is not forbidden is allowed, it is possible to 
avoid the use of interest.19 
In the Islamic environment, the actual insurance 
also has a specific position. That is prohibited in its 
conventional form. The reason is the prohibition of 
gambling (the maisir principle). The classic insurance 
relationship is characterized as the insured as a buyer 
pays a periodic premium as the price, but depending 
on chance may or may not receive the object of sale 
(Maitah, 2010). Alternatively, insurance prohibition is 
explained by Kohout (2005) as follows: It is a gener-
alization of the prohibition of interest, as the interest 
is seen as a guaranteed return, and it also concerns 
the fact that one cannot oppose the will of Allah – that 
is to insure oneself against ill fortune. Islamic scholars 
have had to come up with an alternative insurance 
principle that would be in agreement with the princi-
																																																													
17 The provision of § 1, paragraph 2 of Act No. 21/1992 
Coll., on banks, the current version. 
18 The change of the return in deposit accounts is addressed 
in § 94, paragraph 5 of the Act No. 284/2009 Coll., the 
Payment System Act, the current version, in which a unilat-
eral change in interest rates is possible, but only as a result 
of changes in referenced rates. It is not possible to change 
interest based on other factors. Due to the inability to share 
profits and losses, a potential Islamic bank would not be 
able to accept deposits only for custody (i.e. the same as in 
current accounts’ wadia). However, domestic banks may 
also offer investment accounts through affiliated investment 
companies, because the principle of sharing profits and 
losses is possible in the collective investment. It seems, 
therefore, that any Islamic bank in the Czech Republic 
would be able to carry out the main focus of its activities. 
19 The authors are inclined positively towards the question of 
the possible existence of Islamic banks in the Czech Repub-
lic. 
ple of maisir. This Islamic alternative is called takaful. 
It is based on an often-mentioned call for solidarity in 
the Quran. The risk in such an insurance system is not 
sold, but shared. Individuals contribute to a fund that 
is in their ownership. In the event of a claim, the dam-
age is absorbed on the basis of mutual assistance.20 
Islamic financial institutions are often accused of 
money laundering activities. It should be emphasized, 
however, that such action is contrary to Islam. The 
source of support is particularly the Quran verse 
2:188: And do not consume one another’s wealth un-
justly or send it to the rulers in order that you con-
sume a portion of the wealth of the people in sin, while 
you know! Zulkifli (2006) explains that the word 
fraudulent refers to all property acquired by illegal 
means, such as theft, fraud, smuggling, etc. Since 
Islam despises wealth thus obtained, money launder-
ing is contrary to Islam itself. From the verse of the 
Quran 3:104, which reads And let there be from you a 
nation inviting to good, enjoining what is right and 
forbidding what is wrong …, it can then be deduced 
that both individuals and private and public institu-
tions have the obligation to build a healthy Muslim 
society. A corollary is that the Islamic financial insti-
tutions have a duty to take preventive measures to 
fight money laundering, as they are in direct conflict 
with the teachings of Islam (Zulkifli, 2006). Islamic 
financial institutions are thus under dual control – 
controlled by the state where they work and by the 
Islamic Supervisory Board, which oversees compli-
ance with Islam. Nevertheless, as stated by Hassan 
and Lewis (2007), after 11 September 2001, a tenden-
cy appeared to confuse the Islamic financial institution 
funds with financing Islamic terrorism. That is mis-
leading by itself. In the words of Hrdličková (2013), 
…financial institutions with business that is founded 
on the principles of ethical financing, such as the 
principles of Islamic finance law, and which carry out 
their activities in accordance with these principles, 
cannot be evaluated without further suspicion due to 
the increasing risk in relation to such activities, such 
as money laundering or financing terrorism.  
In relation to the further text, it is useful to men-
tion along with Mudarabah another banking product, 
namely Murabaha. This is often referred to as a costs 
plus surcharge. Murabaha is not based on the princi-
ple of sharing profits and losses, which makes it 
somewhat controversial. It is a tripartite contractual 
relationship between the seller, the client and the 
bank. The client will ask the bank to acquire certain 
assets from a third party, precisely specified in the 
																																																													
20 For more about Islamic insurance, see for example 
Khorshid, A. (2004). Islamic Insurance: A Modern Ap-
proach to Islamic Banking. London: RouteledgeCurzon. 
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contract, which the client purchases from the bank. 
The actual purchase of an asset at a predetermined 
price is usually associated with a deferral. The bank’s 
profit in the form of a surcharge is justified as remu-
neration for the work and risk-taking. 
In Islamic economics, just as in its conventional 
counterpart, the central bank has a crucial role in regu-
lation and supervision. On one hand, it must protect 
the interests of its depositors, especially smaller ones. 
It was Siddigi (1983) who emphasized that the basis of 
such efforts is proper investment diversification and a 
safe ratio between basic capital and deposits. The 
ultimate objective of monetary policy is identical. 
While the Czech constitution speaks of price stability, 
in Iran, for example, the main objective is defined as 
preservation of the value of the national currency. 
However, the special traits of Islamic economics de-
termine that the local central bank must achieve its 
main goals differently. The special traits of the Islamic 
monetary policy can be seen in two areas. First, the 
instruments of monetary policy cannot use an interest 
rate in any form and must also choose a different 
transmission mechanism.21 The second area is com-
prised of the instruments of monetary policy. Islamic 
economists are clearly aware of the importance of 
interest rates in the regulation of the amount of money 
in the economy. It was therefore necessary to respond 
to the demands of Islam and construct alternative in-
struments, which the central bank would use to replace 
the role of interest in monetary policy. The philosophy 
of the principle of sharing profits and losses, which 
uses the profitability of the project for the allocation, 
was used as a base for its construction. The central 
bank can act as a lender of required liquidity for a 
commercial bank. The charge for this service is the 
weighted average rate of return prevailing in the state 
economy. The weight is given by the importance of 
individual sectors in the economy. Unlike interest, this 
would not be a fixed fee. On the contrary, it would be 
dependent on the real profitability of the financial 
capital, which is the core argument on which the pre-
sumption of the compliance of the described instru-
ment with Islamic law is based. Thus, an instrument 
constructed in this way would naturally correct an 
economy towards zero inflation. In times of a growing 
economy, when the profitability in the economy is 
																																																													
21 Currently, the most common transmission mechanism is 
inflation targeting, which is also applied by the Czech Na-
tional Bank. Here it is also used as the interest rate channel, 
which may not be used in the case of the Islamic central 
bank. It must use an alternative transmission channel, for 
example, the bank-lending channel, the efficiency of which 
has been studied in Malaysia. See Zamrah and Majid (2011). 
 
high, the lending fee would also be high, which would 
subsequently reduce the aggregate expenses as well as 
the pressures of inflation. On the contrary, in times of 
recession, when the profitability in the economy is 
negative, the lending fee would also be negative (a 
bank would be required to repay less than it bor-
rowed), which would subsequently prevent deflation 
(which is often considered from a macroeconomic 
point of view to be more damaging than inflation) 
through an increase in the aggregate demand. The 
Islamic central bank could at its discretion debit the 
weighted rate of return with a plus or minus surcharge 
that would enable it to enter and affect the aggregate 
demand and thus inflation actively (Zangeneh and 
Salam, 1993). The Islamic central bank may carry out 
trades on the free market with the same intention as a 
conventional bank, but not using conventional finan-
cial instruments such as treasury bills or bonds. How-
ever, there are viable alternatives – noteworthy in 
particular are the Islamic bonds, alternatively called 
sukuk. 
Sukuk represents participation in a particular un-
derlying asset from which its profitability is derived: 
The benefit of owning an underlying asset is trans-
ferred to the holder of a sukuk certificate along with 
its entire revenue but also with the risk of potential 
loss (Schoon et al., 2009). The real construction of 
sukuk itself is similar to the process of securitization 
used on conventional markets – given pooled assets, 
the bonds are emitted. The profitability is derived 
from cash flow that is generated by the underlying 
assets. The Accounting and Auditing Organization for 
Islamic Financial Institutions (AAOIFI) defines sukuk 
as: … certificates proving a shared co-ownership on 
the ownership of tangible assets, right of use and ser-
vices or assets of particular projects or special invest-
ment assets. Sukuk, as opposed to a conventional 
bond, is not a long-term debt security but a document 
confirming co-ownership of the asset defined. 
4.1 Islamic banking 
Islamic banking, also commonly referred to as inter-
est-free banking, has earned the attention of the West-
ern world due to its turbulent growth in recent years. 
The key feature of Islamic banks is developing bank-
ing activities in accordance with the principles of Sha-
ria. According to Khan (2010), it is preferable to use 
the term Sharia-compliant finance instead of the term 
Islamic banking. Both Muslim and non-Muslim cli-
ents may use the services of such institutions. Accord-
ing to El Hawary et al. (2007), Islamic banking or 
rather finance is characterized by four attributes: (1) 
symmetrical sharing of risk and profit, (2) the finan-
cial transactions must be either directly or indirectly 
linked to real economic transactions, (3) non-
exploitation of any contracting party and (4) a prohibi-
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tion on funding activities that are sinful from the per-
spective of Islam (such as alcohol). Islamic banks 
perform the same function as conventional banks, 
namely as payment service providers and financial 
intermediaries. There are three basic models, under 
which they carry out their activity – the two-tier 
mudarabah, two-windows and wakala models. Islamic 
banking is, however, also subject to criticism. For 
example, Kuran (2005) states that Islamic banking 
was not designed as a viable alternative to conven-
tional banking, but mainly to strengthen the Islamic 
identity. He illustrates this statement by the fact that, 
in practice, Islamic banks behave similarly to conven-
tional banks, despite their moral principles. 
5. System of sharing the risks and losses in prac-
tice 
Although Islamic economic theory sees its main basis 
in the sharing of risks and losses, a number of compli-
cations are associated with this principle in banking 
practice. Islamic economists cannot have missed this 
fact either. Ahmed (2010) identifies three main cate-
gories of issues: 
 Problematic funding of long-term and low-
return projects 
 Problematic funding of small businesses 
 Problematic money lending to an already oper-
ating business enterprise 
From the perspective of assessment procedures, 
negotiations with the given business enterprise and the 
requirements regarding the expertise and experience, a 
system based on sharing profits and losses is much 
more expensive than conventional (interest-based) 
loans. The reason is the participation in the profit. The 
bank must investigate in much greater detail the prof-
itability of the business enterprise, the chance of suc-
cess of the given project or the prerequisites of the 
business enterprise to implement the project success-
fully. This is all in addition to and with regard to the 
anticipated future development of not only the busi-
ness unit itself, but also the entire industry. All the 
variables that the bank must consider before granting 
such a product are then subject to uncertainty, which 
increases in direct proportion to its duration. This is 
why banks avoid funding long-term projects. Another 
reason that speaks against long-term funding is a char-
acteristic feature of the product based on the sharing 
of profits and losses. With the traditional Mudarabah 
and Musharakah, the invested amount and any poten-
tial share of the profit is paid on the termination of the 
relationship between an investor and an agent. Unlike 
a standard loan, there are no regular repayments. 
Products based on the sharing of profits and losses tie 
down all the invested capital throughout their dura-
tion. Due to this fact, compared with conventional 
banks, Islamic banks are very limited in the payment 
of money deposits. 
The issues outlined in the paragraph above are 
even more visible when it comes to the finance of 
small businesses. A bank is not able to analyse re-
sponsibly the expected profitability of each small-
business project at sustainable costs. Raquib and Ah-
med note the results: Many of these small producers, 
who traditionally were able to obtain interest-based 
credit facilities on the basis of collateral, are now 
finding it difficult to raise funds for their operations 
(Ahmed, 2010). 
A functioning company often needs a fast liquidity 
supply to be able to satisfy unexpected needs. 
Mudarabah and Musharakh are primarily intended for 
financing completed projects. In the case of small 
loans, which an entrepreneur often needs only for a 
solution to a partial issue, it is difficult, if not impossi-
ble, to calculate the profit that this capital actually 
generated. The use of products based on the sharing of 
profits and losses is in such cases impossible in prac-
tice. 
Even the efforts to implement the principle of shar-
ing profits and losses in financial instruments are fac-
ing difficulties. It is worth paying particular attention 
to the difficulties in connection with Islamic bonds. In 
the past, for emissions of these bonds, an effort has 
been recorded to establish their profitability on the 
referential interest rate. This, however, was sharply 
attacked by the legal community, which argued par-
ticularly the need to derive profitability from the un-
derlying real assets. Establishing the bond profitability 
of LIBOR rates, bonds torn off from reality and thus 
these bonds become identical to the conventional al-
ternatives (Al-Amine, 2008). In 2008, new standards 
were issued by AAOIFI,22 which tightened the re-
quirements for bonds based on sharing the profit and 
loss. The response of the markets was a further reduc-
tion of interest for these bonds (Azmat et al., 2013). 
Although the use of the referential rate is inadmissible 
from the viewpoint of Islamic law, it would be a solu-
tion to the essential problem of the bond structure – 
the lack of transparency in markets in which Islamic 
bonds are generally allocated and the resulting infor-
mation asymmetry. However, due to the increased risk 
(the principal is not guaranteed either) of these bonds, 
the requirement for an information base is essential. 
Knowledge from the real behaviour of issuers has 
																																																													
22 The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions – the organization issues generally 
recognized standards, which play an important role in the 
gradual harmonization of Islamic finance. Compliance with 
the rules of AAOIFI is voluntary and unenforceable, but its 
standards are reflected in practice. 
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shown that companies that are expecting low profita-
bility of their projects or that are experiencing a higher 
risk of possible loss tend to share the profit and loss 
through bonds. In the case of the opposite anticipation, 
they resort to bonds carrying a fixed income for their 
holders (Godlewski et al., 2013). 
6. Islamic law and its circumvention 
With the renaissance of Islam, customers’ demand for 
products that would be in accordance with Islamic law 
has also emerged in other countries that are not solely 
populated by a Muslim majority. Islamic banking has 
a huge potential in Europe, among others, especially 
in the context of demographic forecasts of the growth 
of the Muslim population. However, in terms of eco-
nomic results, Islamic banks have a more difficult 
starting position due to the requirements imposed by 
Islamic financial law, which makes them less competi-
tive from the perspective of financial ratios.23 The 
lower profitability (in 2012 the ROE indicator aver-
aged 10% for Islamic banks, while for conventional 
banks it was 13%) is mainly caused by higher operat-
ing costs, which are the result of the characteristic 
method by which Islamic banks operate. Compared 
with conventional banks, the costs associated with 
bank employees are higher. In 2010, Islamic banks 
spent 60% of their total operating costs on their em-
ployees, while conventional banks spent 54% (Nazim 
and Ibrahim, 2012). 
The economic results of Islamic financial institu-
tions are burdened by the restraints of Islamic finan-
cial law as well as the management of financial capi-
tal. Islamic financial institutions may only invest in 
instruments that comply with Islamic law and the 
conventional instruments usually (though not flat rate) 
do not. In this context, the Central Bank of Malaysia 
and Securities Commission Malaysia refer in their 
annual report (2009) to the so-called captive investor. 
Due to the sustained growth of Islamic finance, the 
demand for all acceptable investment opportunities is 
growing and, as a result, there is currently excess de-
mand for Islamic products over their offer. This fact is 
reflected – among other things – in the lower perfor-
mance of Islamic investment companies associated 
with a poorer ability to diversify their portfolio (Al-
																																																													
23 Islamic banks, however, have a competitive advantage in 
selected characteristics. For example, the clients of Islamic 
banks hold a larger percentage of their deposits in their 
current accounts than is the case with conventional banks. 
Given that Islamic banks offer their current accounts interest 
free, the deposits are cheaper overall for the Islamic bank. In 
addition, the focus on retail clients allows Islamic banks to 
achieve higher margins (Nazim and Ibrahim, 2012). 
Khazali et al., 2013). This situation has consequences 
for example for the Islamic bonds – empirical studies 
suggest that there are different reactions of stock mar-
kets to the issuance of Islamic bonds of private com-
panies in comparison with the response to the issuance 
of conventional bonds. The reasons for this are com-
panies moving to the markets of Islamic bonds, know-
ing that financing through the conventional market is 
no longer available to them. On the contrary, the Is-
lamic markets perceive these companies as an afford-
able way to gain their funding, with the knowledge of 
the excess demand for financial instruments. Stock 
markets predict such behaviour and view the issuance 
of Islamic bonds as signalling the potential problems 
of the business. As a result, their negative reaction is 
characterized by a reduction in the share price, while 
in the case of the issuance of conventional bonds, the 
market responds insignificantly (Godlewski et al., 
2013). Islamic financial institutions are also limited in 
terms of dealing with excess cash. Instruments such as 
treasury bills and repo operations are banned by Is-
lamic banks due to the fact that they bear interest (the 
principle of the prohibition of riba). Although Islamic 
finance was created regarding the management of 
liquidity with free alternatives, those are still the sub-
jects of controversy. These tools are either less profit-
able24 compared with conventional tools (modified 
Mudarabah) or are rejected by some Muslim lawyers 
(securities and stocks based on bai' dayn). 
Islamic financial institutions are facing the obvious 
fact that the principles of Islamic financial law deviate 
from economic effectiveness in many elements. This 
creates a tension between the objectively existing 
economic ties, to which practice tends to incline, and 
the ideals of Islam. In order to preserve the authentici-
ty of Islamic banking, effective regulation and super-
vision by an independent authority are required. Cur-
rently, financial regulation in Iran, Sudan and Pakistan 
is fully Islamized, and compliance is supervised by the 
state. Without the implementation of Islamic financial 
law in a state’s legislation, a bank’s compliance with 
Islamic principles is verified by a group of Islamic 
lawyers organized in committees. They are basically 
employees of the bank. The consent of the given 
committee in the eyes of Muslims declares that the 
																																																													
24 The lower profitability results from the restrictions of 
Islamic financial law. The fundamental philosophy of Islam-
ic finance is that money cannot generate itself. The profit is 
justifiable only if it was achieved through work. In other 
words, free liquidity must ultimately be invested in the real 
economy and in areas that are not haram (such as gambling, 
pork, alcohol, etc.). Difficulties in merging operations and 
the demand for real investment overnight are obvious. The 
presented solutions are thus inevitably on the edge of ac-
ceptability to Islamic law. See Wilson (2007). 
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given financial product is halal, that is, admissible 
from the perspective of compliance with Islam. The 
actual agreement takes the form of a fatwa. However, 
a fatwa itself is not binding law, and its publication 
does not necessarily guarantee compliance with Islam-
ic law. It is therefore clear that there is relatively large 
room for the individual opinions of the scholars.25 It is 
a price paid for the rapid development of Islamic 
banking in recent years, which prevented the estab-
lishment of a central authority supervising the compli-
ance with the provisions by the Islamic banks. It can 
be concluded that the lack of standardization of Islam-
ic banking creates room for deviation of individual 
banks from Islamic law in favour of purely economic 
goals. 
The current practice is clearly marked by the effort 
to catch up with conventional banking in the key eco-
nomic indicators, although it violates the principles of 
Islamic finance. This can be clearly demonstrated by 
several examples. Murabaha is the most significant 
case. It is an agreement whereby the bank purchases a 
prearranged item for the customer from a seller and 
subsequently sells it to the customer, but at a higher 
price. Therefore, the product, due to this characteristic 
feature, is often called costs plus additional fee. An 
increase includes the costs incurred by the bank and a 
predetermined profit. The customer’s payment is de-
ferred and is specified in the agreement. The goods 
remain the property of the bank until the customer 
pays for them. 
Islamic lawyers pay close attention to the differen-
tiation of a fee from interest. Lewis (2001) points out 
that making a profit is associated with the work to 
obtain the goods from a third party, so it is not just an 
exchange of money for other money across time. In 
addition, when implementing Murabaha, each bank 
assumes the risk lasting from the time of the purchase 
of the goods from the seller until its subsequent sale to 
the customer. The argument is also on the different 
character of an additional fee, which is in no way de-
pendent on the duration of the agreement, but is 
charged for the service as evidenced by the absence of 
																																																													
25 Khan (2010) reported that worldwide there are only 20 
universally accepted Islamic scholars. Each of them is on 
average a member of 40 to 50 Islamic Supervisory Boards, 
while the annual fee for membership of one such board is 
between 20 000 and 30 000 dollars. Concurrently, an Islamic 
scholar can earn by certification of significant transactions 
one-off fees of 150 000 up to 500 000 dollars and it is often 
only for the transfer of conventional financial terms to the 
terminology of Islamic jurisprudence. It is thus clear that the 
scholars sitting on the boards have a clear conflict of inter-
est. The only state that has reflected this so far is Malaysia. 
It established that a scholar may be a member of only one 
Supervisory Board. 
penalties for late payments, as it is common for inter-
est (Hassan and Lewis, 2007). 
However, in banking practice, the bank, while pre-
paring the agreement, names the customer to become 
the bank’s agent, who is subsequently instructed to 
accept the goods, negotiate with the seller and inspect 
the goods. At the same time, it delegates all relation-
ships with insurance companies and other governmen-
tal and non-governmental organizations to him/her. 
Defending an additional fee along with pointing out 
the efforts of the bank seem to be in conflict with the 
fact that the bank elegantly delegates all the responsi-
bilities to the customer. The bank also significantly 
reduces the risk carried. The customer becomes fully 
responsible for the goods immediately upon receipt. 
Given that the customer acts simultaneously as an 
agent authorized to accept the goods from the seller, 
the bank does not come into contact with the goods at 
all. In addition, Islamic committees accepted the col-
lection of penalties for late payments, which was justi-
fied by the needs of practice. If the Islamic banks were 
not allowed to use such a method, it would be in the 
field of moral hazard. Insolvent customers would not 
pay and the purchased goods would remain in the 
ownership of the bank. For this reason, the application 
of sanctions against non-payers was allowed by the 
Islamic committees. The argument that the level of an 
additional fee is not dependent on the duration of ma-
turity has proven to be invalid in practice. For exam-
ple, the Kuwait Finance House, for a 10-month-long 
Murabaha, requires an additional fee of 2.29%, for 20 
months it is already 4.58% and for 180 months it is 
54.5% (Kuwait Finance House, undated).  
A fixed, predetermined fee for late payment is ba-
sically interest under a different name. Any profit 
made without one’s own efforts or risk-taking accord-
ing to Islam is illegal, regardless of how well hidden it 
is. In other words, this operation is in substantial con-
trast to the fundamentals of Islamic law, in particular 
the prohibition of riba. The argument that riba is asso-
ciated with a loan while Murabaha is associated with a 
sale does not stand up due to the denial of the spirit of 
Islamic law. This is the spirit that was so emphasized 
in the extension of the interpretation of riba, besides 
usury, to interest. The Murabaha issue is further ac-
centuated by the fact that it is a dominant product of 
Islamic banking, without which the existence of Is-
lamic banking would be unthinkable – Weberová Ba-
bulíková (2001) states that in the 1980s Murabaha 
accounted for more than 80% of the total volume of 
financial transactions. In a later work, Maitah (2010) 
adds that even after almost thirty years, the reality has 
not significantly changed and Murabaha still accounts 
for approximately 75% of the volume of transactions. 
The efforts of Islamic lawyers for the defence are thus 
so understandable because experience clearly shows 
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that banking services cannot be based solely on the 
principle of sharing profits and losses. However, the 
contradiction between Murabaha and Islamic law is 
obvious. Its conscious denial by the Muslim legal 
community only underlines the inability to enforce the 
principles that are incompatible with fundamental 
economic laws. 
In contrast to the dominance of Murabaha, the 
marginal importance of Mudarabah is noteworthy, 
which according to Sadr and Siddigi’s visions was 
supposed to become the principal long-term product of 
Islamic banking. The reason for its marginal im-
portance has already been outlined in the discussion of 
the issue associated with sharing risks and losses – 
both Mudarabah and Musharakah work on this princi-
ple. However, attention should also be paid to the 
efforts of Islamic banks to bridge the problematic 
aspects of Mudarabah. While trying to sandpaper 
those objective economic deficiencies, the banks often 
go beyond the edge of Islamic law. This can be 
demonstrated by the contractual subtype of 
Mudarabah – the Mudarabah with a promise of sale 
(Kahf, undated). It deviates from the generally charac-
terized Mudarabah in a fundamental premise. In this 
type of Mudarabah, it is not just a rab-bal-mal (inves-
tor) who deposits the funds but also an agent (bank 
customer). The ratio at which the initial funds are 
deposited is fixed. The investor provides 90% and the 
agent provides the rest. The subject of this type of 
Mudarabah is, above all, to use deposited funds for the 
construction of movable or immovable property that is 
subsequently sold. A method of returning the funds to 
the bank is particularly controversial. In the standard 
Mudarabah, the customer is the one who manages and 
returns the funds, including the profit share at the end 
of an agreement. In this subtype, the return of the 
funds is ensured by an obligation of the customer to 
purchase a 90% share in the project from the bank, 
while the price of this share is determined in the 
agreement in advance. The bank thus sets a certain 
rate of return, which is not directly proportional to the 
success/failure of the specific project.  
Taking into account violations of Islamic financial 
law by financial institutions that are tolerated, the 
dogmatic approach to similar behaviour on the side of 
the Muslim population is remarkable. An Islamic 
scholar, Qu' ood, dealt with a case in which an unspec-
ified Muslim owned a share of the company that pur-
chased shares of a bank that worked with interest 25 
years ago. The company, however, ran into problems 
and the relevant portion of the shares was transferred 
to this Muslim. The value of the bank’s shares, mean-
while, increased from 1,000, for which it was pur-
chased, to 30,000 Saudi riyals. The owner wanted to 
sell the shares and retain the return. However, the 
Islamic scholar concluded that such an approach 
would be anti-Islamic. In accordance with Islamic law, 
only the retention of his assets is allowed, which is the 
original 1,000 Saudi riyals. The rest was to be donated 
to charity, as it had been achieved in a conflict with 
the prohibition of riba (Qu´ood Ibn, undated). In an-
other fatwa, Usmani addresses the question of a Mus-
lim inquirer who would like to lend the money to his 
friend’s business while the friend would pay him a 
preset amount as a profit share. Usmani identified 
such a loan as non-Islamic because the creditor would 
be the only one burdened by the risk from the business 
activity (Usmani, undated). 
7. Conclusion 
Islam, or Islamic law, is characterized by the efforts to 
control the individual’s life in all its complexity so 
that it is aligned with the will of God. That ideal is 
eternally imprinted in the primary Islamic law, which 
is unchangeable. The flexibility of Islamic law is 
therefore only to be achieved through the interpreta-
tion of the primary sources of Islam. Islamic econo-
mists were thus confronted with a difficult task: to 
design an economic system that would reconcile Islam 
with economic reality. 
Islam itself is distinctively tied to a strong desire 
for a just society. This feature has triggered a major 
discussion on the prohibition of riba, during which 
interest was placed under this term. When arguing 
about its prohibition, issues of morality were accentu-
ated, rather than economic needs. Islamic scholars 
have tried to replace it with the principle of sharing 
the risks and losses. The cost of capital was supposed 
to become a probable rate of return on the capital. 
When analysing the products of the current Islamic 
banks, there is a tendency to move away from the 
principles of Islamic law, when an even deeper gap 
arises between these principles and the practice. It is 
therefore possible to provide a clear answer to the 
question asked in the introduction of this paper – there 
is a contradiction between the actual behaviour of the 
economy or individual businesses and the Islamic 
principles. On one hand, Islamic scholars criticize 
interest for its immorality; on the other hand, they 
quietly accept products that generate profit in a virtu-
ally identical manner. The direction in which practice 
deviates from theory is also noteworthy. There is ap-
parent convergence of real Islamic banking and con-
ventional banking. It is therefore necessary to agree 
with Maitah (2010), who states: Islamic finance is a 
sector that is in many ways trying to rediscover Amer-
ica through a gradual approach to Western financial 
practices. 
In the argumentation of Islamic scholars in con-
nection with interest, some basic economic laws have 
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been omitted. Islamic economics will need to reflect 
the inability to apply the principle of sharing profits 
and losses in a number of projects and openly admit 
the use, albeit regulated, of interest. Although interest 
is from an ethical point of view undoubtedly problem-
atic, it is in many transactions more efficient than the 
application of more moral alternatives. It seems effi-
cient to abandon the dogmatic attachment to particular 
matters and focus on maintaining the basic philosophy 
of Islamic banking – an emphasis on morality, ethics 
and humanity. Interest itself is not able to deny the 
essence of the ideal of Islamic finance, which cannot 
be said about the approach of Islamic lawyers, which 
is currently showing the symptoms of schizophrenia in 
many ways. 
The conclusions of this paper cannot be interpreted 
as questioning the viability of Islamic banking. A 
renaissance of Islamic self-awareness, whereby Islam 
gains a dimension of Muslims searching for their iden-
tity face to face with Western civilization, will contin-
ue to assist Islamic banks in the growth of total depos-
its. In addition, the current Islamic banks show a lower 
tendency to engage in risky and speculative behaviour 
than Western banks (a reflection of the principles 
maisir and gharar). Even in this paper the criticized 
principle of sharing of profits and losses is suitable 
when applied appropriately to reduce moral hazard, 
with which the current Western financial system 
struggles. However, this article has shown the fact that 
the term Islamic bank may to a significant extent be-
come a marketing label rather than a reflection of the 
real performance of such banks in accordance with 
Islamic principles. 
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